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Introduction 
In the past the twenty years, sixteen West European and three East European countries 
have adopted national same-sex union (SSU) laws that legally recognize and bestow benefits and 
duties on gay and lesbian couples who chose to enter such unions.   This rather startling case of 
policy convergence has largely slipped under the radar screen of political scientists and European 
Union scholars.  Despite the lack of attention, the SSU case holds potentially interesting lessons 
for scholars of Europeanization.   
I argue that the EU, the Council of Europe and a transnational network of lesbian, gay, 
bi-sexual and transgender (LGBT) advocacy NGOs have played a crucial role in this policy 
convergence by creating a soft law norm for relationship recognition and disseminating this 
norm to key policymakers in European states.  Thus the nature of the influence that European 
institutions and networks have had on national SSU policy differs from the formal processes of 
implementing EU Directives and European court decisions often emphasized in the literature.  
Until very recently SSU convergence was largely the result of the growing acceptance of the 
relationship recognition norm within European institutions and the subsequent socialization of 
national elites.  In the past three years, however, both the EU and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) have begun mandating some minimal legal recognition of same-sex couples.   
Using Austria and Germany as comparative cases I argue that, in fact, Europe has had a 
far greater impact on national policy outcomes when its influence has been felt through the 
informal processes of norm diffusion and elite socialization than when it has tried to impose 
formal mandates through court decisions and EU Directives.  In Germany, where party elites 
were influenced by the European Parliament’s call for the recognition of same-sex unions as a 
human right and by the example of SSU adoption in other member states, a fragile national 
consensus has formed around the idea of granting same-sex couples most of the rights that 
accrue to marriage.  In Austria, by contrast, where European norms are less influential, a 
European Court of Human Rights’ decision that mandated the legal recognition of same-sex 
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draw some lessons about the important, and often underemphasized, role of soft law socialization 
in Europeanization processes.   
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of the 
Europeanization literature and argues that too little attention has been given to the influence of 
soft law and processes of socialization in these works. The third section introduces the case study 
and outlines the rather rapid adoption of same-sex union laws across Western Europe over the 
past two decades.  It then traces the development of a soft law norm for relationship recognition 
within European institutions and policy networks and argues that this norm and these networks 
are crucial for explaining the wave of SSU adoption described in section three.  Section four 
compares the influence that the this relationship recognition norm has had on the German and 
Austrian governments and posits that the norm has been more influential when applied in a ‘soft’ 
rather than ‘hard’ or legally binding manner.  The final section offers conclusions and explores 
the implications of these findings.   
 
Europeanization and Soft Law 
  Until the early 1990s EU scholarship was focused almost entirely on developments at the 
supra-national level and very little was written about the effects that regional integration has on 
European states.  In the last decade scholars have made up for lost time and developed a vibrant 
literature on the question of Europeanization.  Although this literature is more coherent than 
many, the definition of its core concept has inevitably varied from study to study.  Some such as 
Risse, Cowles and Caporasso (2001) define Europeanization as the creation of European 
governance structures and networks.  Most Europeanization studies, however, use the concept to 
describe how EU structures affect politics in the member states.  Ladrech (1994) and Falkner et 
al. (2005) define Europeanization simply as a top-down process of EU influence in member 
states.  Others such as Radaelli (2003) and Heritier et al (1996) define it more broadly and 
include both top-down processes of EU influence on member states as well as bottom-up 
processes of member state influence on EU institutions and decision making processes.  Still 
others see the interaction of EU institutions, member states and transnational actors in less linear 
terms and argue that the process of Europeanization has to be seen more holistically as a process 
of fusion (Kohler-Koch and Edler 1998; Wessels 1996).   
While many scholars include soft law norms in their definitions of Europeanization, most 
studies usually mean this to include the non-binding resolutions, decisions or proclamations of 
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largely ignored the perhaps even softer norms created by NGOs, informal transgovernmental 
networks or the interaction between member states.  Radaelli is the most explicit about the 
narrowness of this conceptualization of soft law and argues that the literature should and usually 
does focus on processes of ‘EU-ization’ (2003).  In their latest contribution to the debate Tanja 
Boerzel and Thomas Risse argue that to be useful Europeanization should be narrowly focused 
on the impact that Europe has on the political processes and outcomes of domestic politics but 
that scholars should not limit the effects of Europe to those that emanate from the EU (2007: 
484-485).  Influence from sources such as transnational networks of non-state actors, the Council 
of Europe and state to state interaction also need to be examined if we are to understand the full 
‘power’ that Europe has on  the domestic politics of the region’s states.   
For the purposes of this paper, I use the wider definition of Europeanization suggested by 
Boerzel and Risse and take it to mean the processes by which domestic actors confront and react 
to adaptation pressure exerted by European institutions, networks, policies and norms.  By taking 
a broader view of both what counts as Europe and what counts as soft law, my approach more 
closely approximates work carried out by constructivists on the domestic effects of European 
socialization processes (Checkel 1999; 2001; Risse 2001).  This approach is necessary to explain 
the outcomes of my particular case as the EU, the Council of Europe, the European Court of 
Human Rights, transnational advocacy NGOs and individual governments all have played a role 
in the creation and dissemination of the SSU relationship recognition norm.  However, the 
influence that this norm has had on domestic policy suggests that this broader definition may be 
necessary to understand the impact of Europe in certain policy areas, particularly in the field of 
human rights. It also suggests that the creation of European norms is not the sole purvey of the 
EU or even the Council of Europe.  By ignoring the norms that develop in less institutionalized 
settings, we may be missing a great deal.   
Despite the varying definitions that exist in the Europeanization literature, the categories 
authors use to describe the impact the phenomena has on European states are surprisingly 
similar.  Almost all studies have concluded that the EU and its policies have a differential impact 
on member state actors and policy areas.  The reaction can take the form of inertia, absorption, 
accommodation, transformation and retrenchment (Boerzel 1999; Radaelli 2003).  That is state 
actors can try to ignore the adaptations demanded by Europe, they can absorb them with minimal 
change to core national norms or structures, they can accommodate more substantial changes 
within stable national structures or they can be forced or persuaded to transform key parts of that 
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national actors to not only resist European mandates for change but go in the opposite direction.  
As such these measures of Europeanization are closely associated with the related but distinct 
concept of (degrees of ) convergence, although this is only intermittently acknowledged in the 
literature.  
The literature as a whole has also identified four broad, non-mutually exclusive  
mechanisms through which the EU can influence its member states: institutional compliance or 
mimicry, altering domestic political opportunity structures, regulatory competition and 
normative socialization (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Radaelli 2000).  The first occurs when 
European institutions are either forced on or mimicked by states.  The second refers to situations 
in which European policies or institutions shift the relative power or influence of key domestic 
actors and therefore political outcomes in individual polities.  Regulatory competition occurs 
when economic integration and mandatory mutual recognition of national regulation leads to a 
regulatory race to the bottom as member states seek to attract business and capital to their 
national markets.  Normative socialization occurs when European legislation or soft-law norms 
cause domestic policy makers to redefine their interests or identities.   
Because scholars have found that Europe’s impact differs across states, policy areas and 
time, most of the research has focused on how certain factors mediate these mechanisms of 
influence.  The literature is dominated by the ‘goodness of fit’ approach which relies heavily on 
rational and sociological institutional theory to explain when and how Europe affects political 
outcomes in member states.  Drawing on earlier works such as Francesco Duina’s Harmonizing 
Europe (1999) and Andrienne Heritier et al’s Ringing the Changes in Europe (1996) Risse, 
Cowles and Caporaso argue that the challenge a particular EU policy poses to an individual 
member state depends on the compatibility of a European policy and a country’s national 
administrative style (2001; see also Boerzal and Risse 2003).  Adjustments and convergence can 
only occur when a European policy or norm differ from national standard operating procedures 
and institutional structures.   
The extent to which a member state government will adjust to a ‘misfitting’ policy 
depends on how domestic structures and actors mediate the pressure for change.  Different 
authors focus on different mediating factors.  Many have emphasized the importance of the 
number of domestic veto points as barriers to domestic change (Risse et al 2001; Haverland 
2004).  The capacity of implementing institutions is highlighted by others (Radaelli 2003).  Still 
others have examined the role that domestic interest groups play in ‘pulling down’ or blocking 
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at the role that the EU Commission plays in ‘pushing’ certain policies on its member states.   
  As noted above most of these studies have focused on the effects that legally binding EU 
legislation has on member states during the implementation of these policies.  Surprisingly little 
empirical work has been carried out on how soft law norms have effects in European countries.  
The work that has been done on soft law norms such as Falkner et al’s recent study on the 
implementation of EU social policy often examines the effects of non-binding norms that attach 
themselves to binding EU Directives or less formal Commission decisions (2005).
1  Although 
the ‘goodness of fit’ and domestic mediating factors approach can be used to interpret the 
broader processes of Europeanization and normative influence under study in this paper, the 
paper’s findings do challenge some of the conventional wisdoms associated with the approach.   
First the level of cross-country convergence that has occurred in the area of SSU policy, 
at least in Western Europe, is far greater than the ‘goodness of fit’ approach would imply is 
likely. Thirty years ago, the level of misfit between the relationship recognition norm and all 
country’s family policy law was profound.  The fact that all West European states except Italy, 
Greece and Ireland now have a national SSU law in place and two of those exceptions, Italy and 
Ireland, are now debating such a law in parliament was unthinkable even ten years ago.  Of 
course a great deal of variety exists in the types of laws that have been adopted but the level of 
policy convergence by any definition of the term is really quite astounding.  The reason this level 
of convergence has occurred I argue is that European institutions and networks have been able to 
convince governments to redefine their interests or more precisely their definition of what 
constitutes a rights issue.  Thus the mechanism of Europeanization at work here is transnational 
socialization processes.  Because too few scholars have looked at this mechanism in the 
empirical work on Europeanization, too much of the literature takes the idea of national policy 
style as a fixed concept, a critique noted by others (see for example Heritier et al 2001).  As the 
SSU case illustrates well, participation in European networks and institutions can cause societies 
and governments to drastically redefine their interests in certain policy areas.  
The different manner in which the Austrian and German governments have reacted to the 
relationship recognition norm also challenges the idea of ‘fit’ to a certain extent.  One of the big 
differences between the two countries, I argue, is the greater legitimacy that European norms of 
                                                 
1 Checkel’s work on the impact that norms developed within the Council of Europe’s citizenship regime is an 
exception to this rule.  Other scholars such as Maria Green Cowles’s (2001), Mark Thatcher’s (2000) and Volker 
Schneider’s (2001) work on the effects of European markets and business associations also take a less formal 
approach to European influence.   
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2  The issue is not how well the relationship 
recognition norm fits with pre-existing German and Austrian family and human rights policy, 
rather it is how willing either society and government is to pay attention to any European norms.  
The fact that Europe has more legitimacy in Germany made it easier for German LGBT groups 
to use the norm and examples from other EU member states to put the issue on the political 
agenda.  Profound change can occur to national policy styles through transnational socialization 
processes but the socializees need to have confidence in the socializers.  In some cases European 
norm legitimacy matters more than norm fit.  
The domestic mediating factors found to be important in this case also differ from those 
commonly cited in the Europeanization literature.  In addition to European norm legitimacy, the 
ideological nature of the governing coalitions also plays an important role in SSU policy 
outcomes.  Because change and convergence occurs through persuasion, the ideological 
commitments of the majority parties in government are important.  Social Democratic and Green 
parties have proven more open to accepting the argument that denying same-sex couples state 
recognition amounts to illegal discrimination than Conservative or Christian Democratic parties.  
Again a state’s policy preferences are not static but dependent on a number of variable political 
factors.   
Finally the SSU case also challenges a conventional wisdom often propagated in the 
wider EU literature, namely that soft law often implies soft compliance (Cini 2001).  In the case 
of SSUs a non-binding norm for relationship recognition has had tremendous influence on 
domestic policies.  As will be shown, somewhat ironically, the harder this norm has become, the 
more resistance it has encountered.  This implies that at least with some policies, soft law norms 
need to be accepted before hard law can be imposed.   
 
Same-sex Unions Policy in Western Europe: Convergence through Normative 
Socialization
3
This section begins with a short description of the policy convergence that has occurred 
across West European democracies in the area of relationship recognition since 1989 (see 
                                                 
2 In another work, forthcoming,  I have argued that differences in religious cultural values are necessary for 
understanding why some advanced industrial democracies have not adopted an SSU law while the vast majority 
have.  This argument more closely approximates the ‘fit’ thesis prominent in the Europeanization literature.  That is 
more religious AIDs have rejected the relationship recognition norm because it does not fit with their societies 
traditional view of family and marriage.  I do not argue that ‘fit’ is unimportant, I simply argue that international 
norm legitimacy must also be taken into consideration.  In the German and Austrian case differences in religious 
cultural values are in fact quite minimal and therefore cannot explain the differing SSU outcomes.   
3 This section draws heavily on a previously published article, k. Kollman, “Same-sex Unions: The Globalization of 
an Idea” (International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming).  
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actors and norms have played in this convergence.   
Denmark adopted the world’s first national same-sex union law in 1989.  The registered 
partnership model adopted by the Danish government was soon emulated by its Nordic 
neighbors.  Norway adopted a similar registered partnership law in 1993, followed by Sweden 
and Finland in 1994 and 2001 respectively.  Unlike some of the subsequent same-sex registered 
partnership laws adopted by countries outside the region, the Nordic countries have extended 
most rights and responsibilities that accrue to heterosexual marriage to this new institution. 
Couples are allowed to register publicly at the town hall, as is the case with heterosexual couples 
who wish to marry.  Same-sex couples who register gain all the tax benefits, inheritance rights, 
pension rights and mutual liability responsibilities granted to heterosexual married couples.  The 
only major rights that were denied to same-sex registered partners were the rights of adoption, 
the use of the term husband and wife and the right to a church wedding.  Most Nordic countries 
subsequently have loosened adoption laws so that a member of a registered partnership can adopt 
their partner’s biological child.  Additionally, Sweden now allows same-sex couples to adopt a 
non-biological child jointly. (Merin, 2002: 67-78).   
  The deliberations over this legislation in the Nordic countries set the stage for how the 
debate has been carried out in most other western democracies, although it was more muted here 
than in the campaigns later waged in France and Germany.  Human rights oriented LGBT groups 
first promoted SSU proposals and then sought support among left leaning parties.  These 
proposals were opposed by the conservative parties and, in the Nordic countries, by members of 
the established Lutheran Churches (Merin, 2002).  As a result, most of these SSU laws included 
assurances that religious institutions would not have to recognize or perform commitment 
ceremonies for same-sex couples.
4   
  By the late 1990s the idea of legalizing SSUs moved out of the Nordic region and onto 
mainland Europe.  The rest of Europe, however, has uniformly accepted neither the norm of 
legalizing SSUs nor the particular model first developed in Denmark.  A number of societies 
including Italy, Ireland and Greece have not yet adopted such legislation.  Additionally, a 
number of new models have been added to the registered partnership scheme.  In 2000, Germany 
adopted legislation that was similar to the Nordic registered partnership laws albeit with less 
                                                 
4 Minority voices within the LGBT community, particularly some lesbian organizations that view marriage as a 
patriarchal institution, also opposed the legal recognition of same-sex couples.  By the mid 1980s the human rights 
wing of most national LGBT movements had become firmly entrenched as the mainstream voice of the movement. 
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at the end of 2003.   
The Netherlands and Belgium adopted registered partnership laws in 1998 and 2000 
respectively that are open to heterosexual as well as to homosexual couples.  In addition both 
countries extended marriage rights to same-sex couples in 2001 and 2003 respectively.  Spain 
became Europe’s third country to grant marriage rights to gay and lesbian couples in 2005.  
France created a new institution called Civil Solidarity Pacts open to both homosexual and 
heterosexual couples, which is easier to enter into and dissolve and does not accord couples the 
full set of rights given to married heterosexuals.  Finally, Portugal and Austria legally recognize 
same-sex unions through an unregistered cohabitants model that does not include a formal civil 
ceremony and which includes less than the full palette of rights and benefits that married couples 
enjoy (Wintemute, 2005).  Although this paper largely focuses on Western Europe, several 
Eastern European countries have also adopted SSU laws over the past few years.  Croatia 
adopted a registered partnership law in 2003 and the Czech Republic and Slovenia both adopted 
a similar law in 2006 (ILGA-Europe 2007). 
To use the language of the Europeanization literature, family policy in West European 
countries has been transformed.  Although this wave of legislation resulted in a variety of 
national SSU laws, West European governments have converged around two key principles that 
were virtually non-existent a mere three decades ago.  The first is that the state should offer 
same-sex couples some form of legal recognition.  The second principle holds that states must 
offer this recognition because to do otherwise represents a form of discrimination that cannot be 
tolerated by governments committed to the core values of liberal democracy.  Thus although the 
SSU debate has taken place in different cultural and political settings, the contours of this debate 
have been remarkably similar across these societies.  Where LGBT groups and their allies have 
been able convincingly to frame the SSU question as a human rights issue, they generally have 
been successful in gaining relationship recognition.  Where this framing has been challenged 
effectively by a cultural/traditional frame, LGBT groups’ attempts at relationship recognition 
have been less successful.   
As is argued below, the cross-national similarity of this debate is not merely coincidental.  
LGBT groups have used European institutions and political forum to create and disseminate a 
soft law norm for same-sex relationship recognition.  These European networks and this norm 
have not only helped to put the SSU issue on the political agenda of many West European 
countries over the past decade, they have also shaped the terms of the debate.  While changing 
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SSU laws in western democracies, the evidence presented below shows how this European norm 
in important ways acted as a catalyst for the adoption of these laws.   
 
The Rise of a European LGBT Network and the Creation of a Relationship Recognition Norm 
With the advent of the gay liberation movement in western societies in the 1970s, the size 
and number of international LGBT organizations increased and a nascent transnational network of 
both international and national LGBT groups began to form.  It wasn’t until the late 1980s, 
however, that many of these groups began to use an explicit human rights frame to promote their 
cause.   At this time a number of LGBT organizations, especially the International Lesbian and 
Gay Association (ILGA), began to pressure more mainstream human rights groups such as Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International (AI) to recognize sexual orientation as a human rights 
issue.  In 1998, after a great deal of internal debate Amnesty International agreed to give issues 
related to sexual orientation a higher priority within its Action Plans and also began including 
individuals imprisoned as a result of their sexual orientation in their rolls of ‘prisoners of 
conscience’. Since that time AI has published three major reports that outline the human rights 
abuses of sexual minorities and has become a key member of the LGBT human rights network 
(Berger, 2001; Bamforth, 2005).   
This transnational strategy has resulted in some successes at the UN level.  The most 
influential transnational LGBT advocacy networks, however, have been formed at the regional 
level.  The West European network is by far the most established and politically successful of 
these regional networks and is held together by the influential ILGA-Europe.  Although ILGA is a 
global umbrella organization made up of over 400 mostly national organizations from over 70 
countries, in the late 1990s, the organization split up into six regional organizations.  ILGA-Europe 
was the first such regional group to form and is much stronger, more developed, more 
professional, and as a result, more influential than the networks found in other regions.  The 
European LGBT network, of course, is not limited to ILGA-Europe but also includes organizations 
such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and certain NGOs that make up the social 
platform of the EU.   The network promotes the rights of LGBT people in two ways.  First, it helps 
national groups network and exchange information about lobbying strategies and policy 
developments in other countries (Interview European LGBT Organization, 8/22/03).  The network 
also promotes its agenda by successfully lobbying intergovernmental organizations to incorporate 
sexual orientation and relationship recognition into the European human rights regime.   
  9The success of the European network’s lobbying efforts partially can be explained by the 
strength of the larger European political-economic regime, which is centered around but not 
limited to the European Union.  As Thomas Risse-Kappen has argued the ability of transnational 
networks to affect domestic policies is in part determined by the extent to which the policy field 
has become institutionalized at the international level (1995).  Probably no other non-economic 
policy area in any region has been as structured by international institutions as human rights policy 
in Europe.  In the wake of the atrocities of World War Two, European countries made a conscious 
decision to enmesh themselves in a strong European human rights regime that is supported by a 
number of regional organizations, the two most important being the EU and the Council of Europe.  
Since its founding as the European Economic Community in 1958, the EU has insisted that 
its members honor the rule of law as liberal democracies.  The European Council, established in 
1949, was created more explicitly to guarantee European citizens’ basic human rights.  The main 
purpose of the Council is to monitor and ensure the implementation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights that contains a set of fundamental human rights to which all of its 41 member 
states must subscribe.  Citizens of these member states can bring suits to the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) if they feel their rights have been violated (Beger, 2001: 25-31).  The 
Convention has been amended several times to extend rights to various groups, although it still 
does not explicitly include sexual orientation as a category for non-discrimination.   
The campaign to include sexual orientation in the European human rights regime began in 
earnest in the mid 1980s.  In part because of the strong representation of Social Democratic and 
Green parties in its chambers, the European Parliament (EP) of the EU has been ILGA-Europe’s 
greatest ally in this fight.  As early as 1984, intensive lobby efforts by ILGA paid off with the 
publication of “Sexual Discrimination at the Workplace” by an EP committee that included sexual 
orientation in its call for more comprehensive anti-discriminatory protections.  This was followed 
ten years later by another EP report entitled “Equal Rights for Homosexuals and Lesbians in the 
EC”, also known as the ‘Roth Report’ after the German MEP who wrote it.  The Roth Report 
condemned discrimination against European gays and lesbians in a wide range of areas and for the 
first time criticized European governments for excluding same-sex couples from national marriage 
laws.  The EP has included a section on sexual orientation in all of its annual reports on the state of 
human rights in Europe since the publication of this report (Beger, 2001: 20-22).  As with the 1984 
report, ILGA lobbied heavily for and participated informally in the drafting of this publication 
(Interview European LGBT Organization, 8/22/2003; Interview European Commission Official, 
8/23/2003).  Although these reports were non-binding, they did a great deal to help define 
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within member states.   
Throughout the 1990s the European LGBT network increased its influence becoming a 
founding member of the EU’s Social Platform of NGOs in 1995 and gaining official consultative 
status with the Council of Europe in 1998.  ILGA-Europe’s biggest victory came in 1997, again 
after years of lobbying, when the EU Intergovernmental Conference agreed to include sexual 
orientation as a category of non-discrimination in the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 
1999.  The Amsterdam Treaty was the first and remains the only legally binding international 
treaty that prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.   
ILGA-Europe has also had successes at the Council of Europe’s ECHR.  It has helped a 
number of gay men and lesbians bring suits in the Court against European governments and 
employers that they claim have violated their rights.  Because the Council of Europe has not 
included sexual orientation in the European Convention on Human Rights, these claims by gays 
and lesbians largely have been made under the guise of the right to privacy.  These court decisions 
have among other things forced the UK government to include homosexuals in their military, 
forbidden the use of sexual orientation against parents in custody battles and forbidden the 
criminalization of homosexual behavior across Europe (Beger, 2001: 25-27).  More recently the 
ECHR has begun to grapple with the issue of relationship rights.  In the 2003 Karner v. Austria 
ruling, the ECHR held that homosexual partners must be granted all the rights and benefits that 
non-married heterosexual couples receive.  To do otherwise, the court ruled, is to engage in 
unlawful discrimination (European Court of Human Rights 2003).  While this ruling does not 
require signatory countries to adopt SSU laws, it does require governments to grant homosexual 
couples all the benefits granted to non-married heterosexual cohabitants and thus creates legal 
domestic partnerships (DP) for homosexuals in countries that have such arrangements for 
heterosexuals.   
The inclusion of sexual orientation in EU Treaties and the recognition of the rights of gays 
and lesbians by the ECHR have also led to the creation of a transgovernmental network of judges, 
legal scholars and policymakers that have come to view sexual orientation-based discrimination 
and SSUs as a human rights issue.  It was national executives and parliaments after all that had to 
sign and ratify the Amsterdam Treaty.  National courts and legislatures have also had to implement 
the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights.  By the beginning of the 2000s a clear, if still 
controversial, norm against sexual orientation discrimination and for the recognition of gay and 
lesbian relationships had been established within key European institutions.  Additionally a 
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the progression of these events).  
 
The Influence of the Transnational Network and Norms on National SSU Policies 
How have the creation of a relationship recognition norm and the growth of a supportive 
transnational network influenced national debates about SSU recognition?  Interviews with key 
policy activists and government documents reveal that the transnational network and European 
human rights regime have influenced domestic policymaking processes through three separate 
processes: national agenda setting, elite learning and direct policy harmonization.  The first of 
these mechanisms occurs when transnationally networked activists use developments in other 
countries or the European arena to help put SSU recognition on the agenda in their own country.  
They further use these examples to frame the issue as a human rights problem.  Although 
transnational influence on agenda setting processes is often subtle, activists and policymakers in 
Germany and Austria mentioned events in other countries as one of the catalysts that helped put 
SSUs on the political agenda in their countries (Interview German LGBT Organization, 7/27/03; 
Interview Austrian LGBT Organization, 12/6/05; Interview Austrian Green Party 12/4/05).   
Additionally, evidence of the use of foreign examples can be found in the literature of 
almost all major LGBT groups in European countries  The websites of these groups very clearly 
announce the adoption of SSU laws in other countries and use these examples to bolster the human 
rights claims of their own arguments for relationship recognition.  LSVD, a German LGBT 
organization, for example, issued a special press release in the summer of 2005 when Canada and 
Spain adopted their same-sex marriage laws.  The headline of the press release read “Canada and 
Spain are in the Passing Lane: Equality in Germany is Long Overdue” (LSVD, 6/29/2005; 
translation by author).  In the UK the decisions of the ECHR have also been important for spurring 
debate in that country.  The incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights directly 
into British law in 1998 resulted in a number of lawsuits that challenged the British government in 
the ECHR to defend several discriminatory laws pertaining to homosexuals both as individuals and 
as couples.  These lawsuits helped put the issue on the agenda in the UK, which resulted in an 
uncontroversial government proposal for a registered partnership law in 2003 (BBC, 10/2/2000).  
These examples from other countries both show the timeliness of such reform and help frame 
SSUs as a human rights issue that an increasing number of liberal democracies are coming to 
recognize.  
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used by LGBT groups and directly from policy elites in other countries and European institutions 
via the transgovernmental networks they inhabit.  In fact activists from several countries 
mentioned that national policy elites found the legal recognition of SSUs by other governments a 
far more persuasive argument in support of relationship recognition than the general public 
(Interview with German Policymaker, 11/18/05; Interview French Policymaker, 10/03/04).  The 
influence of transgovernmental networks is most obvious and strongest in the Nordic countries. 
These countries historically have recognized marriages performed anywhere in the Nordic region 
and intermarriage across the region is common.  Although the other Nordic countries at first 
refused to recognize Danish registered partnerships, the controversy over the issue soon died 
down.  By 1995, after Norway and Sweden had adopted a registered partnership law that mimicked 
the one in Denmark, policy elites from the four countries formed a Nordic Commission on 
Marriage to discuss the recognition of SSUs.  The governments quickly agreed to mutually 
recognize registered partnerships and such recognition has been in place since the mid 1990s 
(Merin, 2002: 77-79).    
Although the influence of elite networking and learning has been subtler in other 
countries, it has played a role in almost all national SSU policy debates.  In its coalition 
agreement of 1998, the Red-Green government in Germany justifies its proposal to enact a 
registered partnership law by quoting the decade-long recommendation of the European 
Parliament for equal relationship recognition (SPD / Die Gruenen-Buendnis 90, 1998).  In the 
White Paper that the Blair government distributed before introducing its own registered 
partnership law, the examples of other countries’ SSU laws are outlined in great detail 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2003).  More recently, a Civil Partnership Bill was 
introduced in the Irish parliament, which the government thus far has failed to bring to a vote.  In 
his justification for the bill, however, the lead sponsor notes the following: 
 
Developments in this area were seen as inevitable in the light of the growing number of 
case precedents under the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and changes 
in the laws of individual member states including our close neighbor, the United 
Kingdom” (Irish Parliament (Oireachtas) 2004).   
 
Policy elites in West European states clearly draw on examples from other countries and 
developments within European institutions to help frame and justify their own support of SSUs.  
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and as more and more l organizations have interpreted their human rights documents to include 
sexual orientation, it has become easier to persuade elites in these countries that this is something 
liberal democracies must do.      
The final way in which European institutions have affected domestic policy, namely by 
attempts to directly harmonize policy within supranational institutions, is also the least common.  
As stated above, no treaty formally recognizes the relationship rights of gays and lesbians and as 
such states are not legally required to do so.  However, European countries are coming under 
increasing legal pressure to grant some relationship benefits to same-sex couples.  The recent 
ECHR decision that ruled the Austrian government must grant same-sex couples the same 
benefits enjoyed by heterosexual cohabitants has in essence created a domestic partnership law 
for gays and lesbians in those European countries that have DPs for heterosexual couples.  In its 
new Directive on the Free Movement Rights of EU Citizens and their families, the EU mandates 
that member states recognize the legal rights of same-sex civil or registered partners if the host 
country has such an SSU law in place and if the SSU law of the country in which it was entered 
into approximates marriage (Directive 2004/58).  While these legally binding mandates are quite 
modest at present, many observers believe it is simply a matter of time before the soft law norm 
for relationship recognition becomes a hard law mandate.  As the comparison with Austria and 
Germany below illustrates, however, the soft law norm has had a far greater impact on national 
policy than the legally binding mandates.   
 
The Same-sex Union Debate in Germany and Austria: When Soft Law Hits Harder 
The German Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz: With a Little Help from European Friends 
  As the two case studies outlined in this section illustrate the relationship recognition 
norm has not simply been disseminated to and accepted by European governments as part of a 
frictionless process.  The SSU norm, as with all European soft-law norms, has to be applied to 
national debates and political processes either by newly socialized policy elites, transnationally-
linked NGOs or both.  The existence of the norm and its endorsement by European institutions 
and states have helped give national LGBT groups and policy activists the necessary confidence 
to place the issue on the political agenda and has lent them a ready-made framework for shaping 
the debate.  There is no guarantee, however, that governments or publics will pay particular 
attention to the new norm nor is there a guarantee that they will be persuaded by the claim 
embedded in the norm that relationship rights = human rights.  As both the Europeanization and 
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In the case of soft law norms it is particularly important that European networks can penetrate 
the domestic setting and that its influence is considered legitimate.  In Germany the make-up of 
governing coalition in the late 1990s, Germany’s longstanding and active participation in 
European institutions and the legitimacy of this participation in the public’s and policymakers’ 
eyes all helped the SSU norm gain traction and change the nature of the debate.  As will be 
shown in the next section, the circumstances were not nearly as favorable in Austria.  
  When Germany adopted its Life Partnership Law (Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz; LPartG) 
in 2000, only three non-Nordic European countries had SSU laws in place and these three—
France, Belgium and the Netherlands—had adopted these laws less than two years beforehand.  
At the time there was little reason to believe that Germany would be an international pioneer on 
this issue.  The processes of secularization while certainly advanced in Germany by 2000 had not 
gone as far as in the Nordic countries or France.  Church attendance levels remain significantly 
higher in Germany than in its northern and western neighbors (Inglehart and Norris 2004).  
Additionally, Germany was only the fourth country after France, the Netherlands and Belgium 
with a substantial Catholic religious heritage to adopt an SSU law.  Support for the law was 
further hindered by the presence of conservative Christian Democratic parties in the German 
party system, a fractious LGBT movement and a prominent clause in the German Constitution 
which calls for ‘the special protection’ of marriage and the family (German Basic Law Art.6(1)).  
Europe played an important but not exclusive role in overcoming these barriers.  
  It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the passage of the LPartG was the result of 
lobby work by two organizations, the Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany (LSVD) and the 
German Green Party.  Both of these organizations are well integrated into European political 
networks and both have used European institutions to advance their political agendas, 
particularly in the SSU case.  Although there is long and rich history of LGBT organizing in 
Germany, LSVD, which is the largest national LGBT group in Germany, is a surprisingly young 
organization.  It was founded as the Gay Man’s Federation (SVD) in 1990 in Leipzig, East 
Germany during the transition to democracy (LSVD 2007).  It is precisely because the 
organization was founded in the East during this period that it was able to adopt an unapologetic 
human rights frame to advance the position of gay men in German society.   
This human rights frame had not been widely used in the West German movement up to 
that point.  Growing out of the student protests of the 1960s and 1970s, the movement had 
promoted a more radical critique of the heterosexual nuclear family and was not terribly 
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had always been the frame of choice for most organizations arguing against homophobia.  The 
rights rhetoric was associated with the liberal state and liberal political parties, both of which 
were categorically rejected by the new social movements in Germany throughout the 1980s 
(Interview LSVD Member 2005; Interview Schwusos Member 2005).  The antipathy towards 
subsuming the LGBT movement under the human right frame still exists in a number of lesbian 
feminist groups in Germany as is evidenced by the fact that lesbian activists chose not join forces 
with the SVD until 1999 when it finally became the LSVD (LSVD 2007).   
The founding of LSVD coincided with the creation of ILGA-Europe and that 
organization’s own shift from a focus on sexual liberation to a focus on the common humanity of 
LGBT people and their rights.  LSVD is one of the more active organizations in ILGA-Europe 
and has both helped shape that organization’s strategy as well as used European legislative 
victories to its advantage in the German political setting (Interview ILGA-Europe 2005).  These 
connections helped reinforce the human rights rhetoric used by LSVD activists by showing them 
how successful it had been in other countries and how it was being incorporated into European 
institutions and legal frameworks.  As such LSVD became the primary conduit by which 
European human rights norms were incorporated into the German LGBT movement.  Although 
the rest of the movement was skeptical of this framing of the problem, German politicians and 
the public reacted quite favorably to their rights based campaigns.   
Probably the most successful of these was the Aktion Standesamt which was carried out 
in 1992.  The action involved over 200 gay and lesbian couples who attempted to get married at 
city hall in various German cities.  This action, which used the example of the newly adopted 
registered partnership law in Denmark to support its claims of marriage rights for same-sex 
couples, resulted in an unsuccessful court case.  More importantly, however, the action gained 
widespread political and media attention and brought the issue to the attention of the general 
German public (LSVD 2002).  For the most part the media coverage was positive and mimicked 
the LSVD’s framing of the relationship issue as a human rights problem (Interview German 
Green Party Member 2005; Der Spiegel 1/6/1992; Sueddeutsche Zeitung 20/8/1992). The LSVD 
had successfully used a human rights frame and European models to put SSUs on the political 
agenda in Germany.  
If the LSVD helped put same-sex unions on the political agenda, it was the German 
Green Party that kept the issue front and center by making it a central part of their political 
program throughout the 1990s.  In fact the links between the two organizations are well-known 
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promote and assure the passage of the LPartG, was the LSVD’s national spokesperson until he 
was elected to the Bundestag in 1994.  Like the LSVD, the German Green Party has strong ties 
with its European counterparts and uses the European political sphere to help promote its 
political agenda at home.  In the case of same-sex unions the European Parliament provided a 
particularly useful forum in which to advance its cause.  The Roth Report discussed above, 
which was the first EP report to call on EU member states to open marriage to same-sex couples, 
was written and promoted by a prominent member of the German Green Party, Claudia Roth. 
This report garnered a great deal of attention within EU institutions and certain member states 
and made Roth a minor political celebrity as a result of the extensive media coverage that 
followed (Beger 2001).  Claudia Roth and the Green Party became an important importer of the 
European norm for relationship recognition.  A number of activists in Germany mentioned the 
importance of this report for convincing the German public and policymakers of the legitimacy 
of relationship rights claims (Interview German Green Party 2005; Interview LSVD 2005; 
Interview Schwusos 2005).   
LSVD and the Greens did a great deal to put the SSU issue on the political agenda as a 
human rights issue, but there was only so much they could do from outside of government.  It 
was not until the Greens became part of the governing Red-Green coalition in 1998 that passage 
of the LPartG had a chance of becoming a reality.  In fact, both the SPD and the Greens had 
included a promise to adopt such a law in their election programs in 1998, but the former had 
largely done so in an attempt to court the latter.  The SPD did have some passionate supporters 
of the LPartG in its parliamentary grouping but these supporters were not particularly well 
represented in the government that took power in late 1998.  It is interesting that the coalition 
agreement between the Greens and the SPD, which for the most part is a sparsely worded 
document, takes the time to mention that the planned SSU law seeks to implement longstanding 
recommendations of the European Parliament (Buendnis ‘90/Die Gruenen / SPD 1998).  In 
addition to being a nod to Claudia Roth, it also seems to be invoking outside support for what 
many in the SPD considered to be a controversial law.   
The fact that the law was adopted just two years after the new government took office 
despite reluctance by prominent members of the SPD is a testament to the hard work of the 
Green Party parliamentary group and Volker Beck in particular (Interview Member of Schwusos 
2005; Interview CDU Parliamentary Staff 2005).  Although the government had the necessary 
votes to adopt the bill in the lower house of parliament, two institutional barriers threatened its 
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unconstitutional by the German courts because of the protection of marriage clause in Article 6 
of the German constitution.  For this reason they decided to model their bill on the Nordic 
registered partnership laws that neither opened marriage to same-sex couples nor created a new 
institution open to both different-sex and same-sex couples as the French PaCS law had done 
(Interview Green Party Member 2005).  This model they felt would be interpreted as less 
threatening to traditional marriage.   
The second, and far more immediate threat to the Life Partnership bill was the upper 
house of parliament, the Bundesrat, which at the time was dominated by the two Christian 
Democratic parties, the CDU and CSU.  Because all bills that affect the federal states in 
Germany must also gain assent from this upper house and because the Red-Green government 
knew the bill would not pass this chamber, it split the bill into two parts.  The first part created 
the new institution and granted same-sex couples such rights as the ability to adopt a common 
last name, the right to remain for non-German partners, and maintenance obligations. This bill 
did not require approval from the Bundesrat and became the LPartG.  The second part, which 
contained many of the financial and tax benefits granted to married couples and did require 
approval from the Bundesrat, did not pass the upper chamber.  As a result the LPartG was a 
much less comprehensive law than its counterparts in the Nordic countries on which it was 
modeled.  The difficult birth of the new law demonstrates how necessary the Greens and their 
European connections were to its success.  
The splitting of the law allowed the Red-Green coalition to overcome one institutional 
barrier but threat of a court challenge still loomed.  This challenge came almost immediately 
after the adoption of the law when three CDU or CSU-led Laender (federal states) launched a 
constitutional complaint with the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional 
Court) on both procedural grounds and substantive grounds asserting that the law violated the 
special protection of marriage clause in the German constitution.  It is interesting to note that the 
federal CDU/CSU parliamentary grouping and a number of CDU-led Laender chose not to join 
the complaint.  Although the CDU/CSU fraction had voted against the LPartG in the Bundestag a 
number of CDU party members were wary of vigorously opposing a bill that was so clearly 
framed as anti-discrimination measure (Interview CDU Parliamentary Staff Member 2005).  
Even in the CDU the norm for relationship recognition had had some socializing effects.   
The heart of the challenge lay with the substantive claim that the law violated the 
marriage protection clause of the Constitution.  When the Constitutional Court published its 
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couples had entered the new unions.  The decision served only to reinforce their new status.  The 
court not only found that LPartG in no way threatened heterosexual marriage but it also let 
lawmakers know that they could bestow more of the privileges associated with marriage on the 
new institution without violating the constitution (BVerfG, 1 BvF 1/01 17/07/2002; Miller and 
Roeben 2002).  This decision, which opponents of the law brought on themselves in what many 
have called an Eigentuer (own goal), did a great deal to solidify the law in German political 
circles and in the eyes’ of the public (Interview Tageszeitung Reporter 2005; CDU Parliamentary 
Staff Member 2005).  Edmund Stoiber, the CSU Premier of Bavaria, who was running against 
Gerhardt Schroeder in a national parliamentary election and who at one point had threatened to 
make LPartG a campaign issue, quietly dropped the issue.  The Liberal Party (FDP) also dropped 
its opposition to the law shortly thereafter and now supports its expansion.   
The most important consequence of the Court’s decision, however, was the confidence it 
gave the Red-Green government to expand the rights contained in the LPartG to include greater 
financial benefits and more controversially step-child adoption rights.
5  The new law, Gesetz zur 
Überarbeitung des Lebenspartnerschaftsrechts, which largely was initiated by the Green 
parliamentary group under the tutelage of Volker Beck, was adopted in 2004 and came into force 
in 2005.  Since this time the debate in Germany has focused on the possibility of opening 
marriage to same-sex couples.  The discussion about rescinding the law, which never really 
caught on in Germany, has completely faded.  
The Court decision clearly solidified the legitimacy of the LPartG in Germany.  The 
influence of European norms and transgovernmental legal networks on this decision are less 
clear and harder to trace than the links between European political forum and LSVD and the 
Greens.  A number of scholars have written about the influence of European Courts, especially 
the EU’s European Court of Justice, on national judiciaries (Slaughter, Sweet and Weiler 1998; 
Slaughter 2004; Conant 2001).  Anne Marie Slaughter in particular has written about the effects 
of transgovernmental legal networks in Europe and the ‘socializing’ effects that they have on 
national members of the judiciary (2004).  Germany has a complicated relationship with the ECJ 
and has on occasion refused to recognize the superiority of EU law, a legal principle it and other 
governments usually recognize (Slaughter 2004: 84-85).  In its LPartG decision, the 
Constitutional Court did not refer to any rulings in other countries or by the ECHR to support its 
                                                 
5 Step child adoption allows a non-biological partner to adopt their partner’s biological child.  The law still forbids 
two same-sex partners from jointly adopting a non-biological child.  
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not common law heritage; the former generally do not use prior case law in decisions.   
In the introduction to the decision the Court does, however, lay out the history of law and 
in this brief description it mentions the adoption of SSU laws in other countries as an important 
precursor to the German debate.  Additionally, it uses the human rights frame in describing the 
purpose of the law as an effort by the legislature to address discrimination against same-sex 
couples.  In this way the Court both made note of examples from other countries as an important 
precursor to the German law and seems to accept the European framing of relationship 
recognition as a rights issue.  The extent to which this norm and the legal precedents from other 
countries and the ECHR influenced their decision is difficult to gauge.  But there is some 
indication that European precedents did enter into their deliberation processes.  
To sum up, European norms and SSU precedents in other European countries did a great 
deal to help German LGBT policy activists to put the issue on the agenda in their own country 
despite the lack of any legally binding mandates to address the issue.  Without the backing 
LSVD found within ILGA-Europe to use an explicit human rights frame, the well-publicized 
calls from the EP to open marriage to same-sex couples, and the long standing example of their 
Nordic neighbors, it seems highly unlikely that the Red-Green Coalition would have found the 
framing or support necessary to promote the LPartG even within their own parties in 2000.  As 
will be seen in the next section, several factors have made the European SSU norm more ‘usable’ 
in Germany than in Austria.  These include the presence of the Green Party in government 
emphasized above but also the comparatively high level of legitimacy Europe enjoys in 
Germany.  Without this legitimacy as the Austrian case illustrates neither soft nor hard law 
norms can have the same effect on the political debates within European states.  
 
SSU Recognition in Austria: A European Laggard?  
  Many of the factors thought to affect the adoption of SSU laws such as levels of 
religiosity, a Catholic heritage, the strength of the LGBT movement, the presence of Christian 
Democratic and Green parties do not differ significantly between Germany and Austria (for an 
overview of these arguments see Kollman 2007).  Both countries have similar reported levels of 
individual church attendance and beliefs and God (Inglehart and Norris 2004).  Both have a 
strong Catholic heritage although Germany does have a mixed Catholic-Protestant heritage.  And 
both countries’ party systems have dominant Christian Democrat parties on the center right and 
well established Green Parties that generally win just under 10% of the vote in national 
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countries’ LGBT movements.  While the Austrian movement does not have the rich history of 
the German movement, strong national LGBT organizations in the form of Hosi-Wien and 
Rechtskomitee Lambda have existed for more than twenty and fifteen years respectively (Hosi-
Wien 2007; Rechtskomitee Lambda  2007).  Further the movement has not had the same 
difficulty employing the human rights frame as the German movement because these 
organizations did not come out of the student protests of the 1960s and 1980s.  As such both 
Hosi-Wien and Rechtskomitee Lambda have been intimately involved in European networks and 
like LSVD in Germany have sought to use European norms and institutions to their advantage.   
  Despite these similarities, Austria’s SSU law is the least comprehensive and least 
generous law in Western Europe outside of the three countries where no recognition exists.  The 
Austrian government grants same-sex cohabitants the same benefits given to non-married 
heterosexual couples.  While same-sex couples do now have certain financial rights such tenancy 
rights, tax breaks and some social insurance benefits, these couples are not able to participate in 
any state sanctioned ceremony.  Austria also has the distinction of being the only country in 
Europe in which this legal recognition was imposed upon them by a European institution, the 
European Court of Human Rights.  This decision, Karner v. Austria, was the result of a case 
launched by a gay man who was denied the right to take over his long term partner’s lease after 
the latter’s death.  Because Austrian law recognizes the tenancy rights of non-married 
heterosexual cohabitants, Karner with the help of Rechtskommittee Lambda, ILGA-Europe and 
Hosi-Wien argued that this amounted illegal discrimination (Rechtskomitee Lambda 2007; 
ECHR 2003).  The ECHR agreed and ordered the Austrian government to grant same-sex 
cohabitants the same rights as the government grants non-married different-sex cohabitants.   
  Although this decision was considered a huge victory for same-sex relationship rights and 
ILGA-Europe and other LGBT groups have touted the success of the legal precedent it set, its 
effect on the legal and political status of same-sex couples in Austria was surprisingly small.  
Despite the fact that most legal experts in Austria thought this ruling would necessitate 
legislative action, the government initially simply changed the wording of a circular about how 
tenancy laws in Austria were to be implemented (Interview Rechtskomitee Lambda Lawyer 
2005).  The government did nothing to change laws governing other rights and benefits enjoyed 
by non-married different-sex cohabitants as the logic of the Karner decision necessitated.  Rights 
such as partner benefits from social insurance programs and tax breaks were not granted to same-
sex cohabitants until the Austrian government was forced to do so by Austrian courts that 
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attempt to draft legislation that would anchor the Karner decision in law and extend state 
recognition of same-sex couples by the Justice Minister, Karin Gastinger of the far right wing 
Alliance for Austria’s Future party, was scuttled by the Minister’s coalition partner, the Christian 
Democrats and members of her own party shortly before the parliamentary elections in the fall of 
2006 (Interview Justice Ministry Staff Member 2005; Der Standard 13/07/06)
 6.   
 The  Karner ruling also had only a marginal effect on political discourse in Austria.  The 
media reported on the ruling but did not hype it or its consequences.  In the eyes of the LGBT 
activists the political elites, especially those in the ruling Christian Democrat / Alliance for 
Austria’s Future coalition, were not forced by the press to respond to the ruling.  As a result very 
little public debate followed from it (Interview Hosi-Wien Staff Member 2005; Interview 
Rechtskomitee Lambda 2005; Interview SoHo Member 2005).  The decision did help embolden 
the two left-wing parliamentary opposition parties, the Greens and the Social Democrats (SPOe), 
to promote the issue more forcibly in parliament.  Both parties had been calling for same-sex 
relationship recognition since the late 1990s.  Using the example of the Nordic countries the two 
parties independently drafted and sponsored parliamentary bills for the creation of a registered 
partnership scheme in 2004 and 2005.  The Green Party bill also called for the opening of 
marriage to same-sex couples in addition to introducing RPs (Hosi-Wien 2007).   
As in Germany European norms and examples have been imported into Austria via the 
left wing parties and transnationally linked NGOs.  Unlike in Germany, however, neither these 
norms nor a legal mandate from the ECHR have led to significant policy change.  Even the 
newly elected Social Democrat-Christian Democrat coalition, which is led by an SPOe Prime 
Minister, has decided to tread softly on the issue.  Despite the SPOe’s past pledges to introduce a 
registered partnership law, the coalition agreement is largely silent on the issue (SPOe-OeVP 
2007).  Since coming to power in early 2007, there has been no indication that the government 
plans to move on this issue any time soon.  The Christian Democrats, although the junior 
coalition partner, still appear able to block any SSU initiatives at least for the time being.   
How can we explain this?  Why has Europe had more of an impact on German SSU 
policy than on Austrian policy despite obvious similarities between the two countries and despite 
the fact that Austria is the only country in Europe that has been mandated by the ECHR to 
                                                 
6 The government did pass a law in the summer of 2006 recognizing the rights of same-sex cohabitant in social 
insurance programs.  This law was passed after an Austrian court based on the Karner ruling had ordered such a 
change.  See Hosi-Wien, Positionen und Foderungen der Hosi-Wien, http://www.hosiwien.at/?page_id=31 
(downloaded 07/05/07).   
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outcomes.  First, the most obvious reason Austria has not adopted a more comprehensive SSU 
law lies in the fact that the conservative OeVP has been in government longer than the existence 
of the European relationship recognition norm.  It was particularly unfortunate for proponents of 
SSUs in Austria that the Christian Democrats became the leading governing party and formed a 
coalition with the far right wing Freedom Party in 1999 just as the norm was reaching a tipping 
point in Western Europe.  Up until 1999, the OeVP had spent most of the post-war era ruling 
with the SPOe in Grand Coalition governments.  In this way the influence of the European 
relationship recognition norm and even the ECHR mandate of recognition has been blocked in 
Austria.  Although not widely recognized in the Europeanization literature, party composition of 
implementing governments does matter.
7  The Christian Democrats, as their counterparts tried to 
do in Germany, have been able almost single-handedly to block SSU legislation in Austria.   
This explanation can only take us so far, however.  Party systems in general are not 
particularly good predictors of which European countries have adopted SSU laws and which 
have not.  Although Green parties were a vital conduit of the SSU norm in Austria and Germany, 
neither the presence of a Green party in parliament nor its participation in government is a 
necessary condition for SSU adoption.  In fact the vast majority of governments that have 
adopted these laws did not include a Green party in the ruling coalition.  While almost every 
SSU law has been passed by a center-left government, Social Democratic parties have proven 
quite capable of promoting and instituting these laws in Western Europe.  Austria in fact had 
SPOe-led government throughout most of the 1990s and since the beginning of this year.  Yet 
none of these governments adopted an SSU law.   
Furthermore, it is curious that the Austrian public has not questioned the OeVP to a 
greater extent on its stance towards SSUs in the wake of the Karner decision and subsequent 
Karner-based Austrian court rulings.  Despite the very public failure of Gastinger’s draft SSU 
bill last summer directly before the election, the topic never became a high profile campaign 
issue (Interview Austrian Green Party MP 2006).  The CDU in Germany has clearly decided to 
drop its active opposition to SSUs since 2002.  The OeVP despite having an ECHR decision 
against them has publicly embraced an anti-SSU position.  There is little evidence to suggest the 
party has been punished for this stance by the electorate or other political elites even though 
public opinion polls show 49% of the public supports the idea of opening marriage to same-sex 
                                                 
7 Falkner et al.’s study on the implementation of EU social policy is an exception to this and the authors encourage 
scholars to pay more attention this variable.  
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2006).     
The second and perhaps more important reason Austria lags behind other West European 
countries in implementing a comprehensive SSU law has do with the lack of power European 
norms have in the Austrian political setting.  The European SSU norm and the example of other 
European countries has shaped the debate in Austria as it has elsewhere in Western Europe.  
LGBT NGOs, the Greens and the SPOe have used European examples and the Karner decision 
to push the issue higher onto the political agenda and to justify their framing of the issue as a 
human rights problem.  The difference in Austria lies in the reception of the norm.  Unlike 
Germany, Austria has not spent all of the post-war era inside the EU.  Because of its location in 
the heart of central Europe the allies designated it as a neutral buffer state in the postwar 
settlement between the US and the Soviet Union.  Although neutrality was imposed upon them, 
Austrians embraced this new status and incorporated it into the country’s postwar national 
identity (Kovacs and Wodak 2003; Thaler 2001).  Germany used its position at the heart of the 
EU to restore its image after the catastrophe of World War Two; Austria used its neutrality.  
While this national conception of neutrality is more flexible than that of its Swiss neighbor, the 
fact that Austria did not join the EU until 1994 has influenced its views of Europe.  The 
controversy surrounding the EU’s condemnation of the inclusion of Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party 
in government in the early 2000s further eroded support for the EU in Austria.   
Not surprisingly Austria is one of the Union’s most Eurosceptic member states.  In the 
latest Eurobarometer poll, the Austrian public was the second least satisfied with EU 
membership of the 25 member states.  Only the UK public was more dissatisfied.  With just 36% 
of the population saying that EU membership was a ‘good thing’, Austria’s satisfaction levels 
were almost 20 percentage points below the EU average.  By contrast 58% of Germans concur 
that EU membership is a ‘good thing’(Eurobarometer 2006).  Similarly when polled about their 
identity, Austrians were comparatively reluctant to say they viewed themselves as Europeans.  
51% of Austrians said they would identify themselves as Austrian only while only 11% have a 
predominantly European identity.  Only four of the twenty-five member state publics have a 
higher percentage of ‘national-only’ identifiers.  In Germany only 34% of the public has a 
‘national-only’ identity and 18% of the German public report feeling predominantly European 
(Eurobarometer 2003).  Although Austria has been a member of the Council of Europe since the 
1950s, its role in Austrian politics is still contested by prominent members of the political elite 
(Interview Austrian Justice Ministry Staff Member 2006; Der Standard 14/11/2006).   
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have in Germany.  The SSU norm has helped shaped the debate there, but neither the Austrian 
public nor its political elites feel as compelled to follow the lead of European institutions or 
states.  While Germany has felt compelled to abandon its penchant for the sonderweg, Austrians 
remain comfortable going their own way on certain issues.  What is interesting in the SSU case is 
that even as the soft law norm for relationship recognition hardened, Austrians felt no more 
compelled to comply with it than they had before.    
To sum up, although the SSU debate has unfolded in very similar manners in Austria and 
Germany, policy outcomes have diverged quite dramatically.  The German public and political 
elites largely have accepted the legitimacy of the European created SSU norm and have 
translated this norm into an increasingly comprehensive and generous registered partnership law.  
Certain parts of the Austrian political establishment by contrast continue to view the central 
claims of the relationship recognition norm skeptically despite its incorporation into the Austrian 
political debate. The ECHR Karner decision against the Austrian government did very little to 
change this situation.  Prominent members of the OeVP continue to reject the legitimacy of the 
norm.  As opinion polls and church attendance levels show, this is not because the Austrian 
public is more conservative than the German public.  Rather the answer seems to lie in the fact 
that European norms are simply less powerful in Austria than in Germany and not powerful 
enough either to persuade mainstream OeVP members of its legitimacy or to have the public 
hold them accountable for this position.   
 
Conclusions  
  Although not widely researched by political scientists, the wave of SSU policy adoption 
in Western Europe over the past eighteen years represents one of the most remarkable cases of 
policy convergence in recent times.  This convergence is all the more remarkable for the fact that 
it largely has occurred in the absence of legally binding international or European mandates for 
this recognition.  Instead the soft law norm for relationship recognition was cobbled together 
through a series of resolutions from the EP, the incorporation of sexual orientation into the 
Treaty of Amsterdam’s discrimination prohibitions, the models provided by Nordic states and 
more recently key decisions by the ECHR.  These models and precedents were shaped by a 
transnational network of LGBT policy activists who also helped disseminate them to European 
states after their creation.  The influence of the SSU norm and these European networks is 
  25reflected not only in the regional and temporal clustering of these laws but also in the rhetoric 
and justifications used by European governments when adopting them.   
  The SSU case demonstrates that diffusely created soft law norms can have profound and 
transforming effects on European states’ policies.  Scholars should not underestimate the power 
of European networks to ‘re-socialize’ domestic publics and elites.  National policy structures 
and styles are not always as fixed as the dominant approaches in the Europeanization literature 
would imply.  However, the homogenizing effect of the European SSU norm should not be 
exaggerated as the German and Austrian comparison illustrates.  As in other Europeanization 
studies, the evidence presented here suggests that pressure for same-sex relationship recognition 
is filtered through domestic mediating factors.  The filters emphasized in this study, party 
composition of ruling coalitions and European norm legitimacy, are not often highlighted in the 
literature.  Their importance for explaining SSU outcomes may be related to the soft law nature 
of the norm.  I suspect, however, that these factors also influence the implementation of more 
traditional and legally binding European laws and should be given greater consideration in the 
literature.  As such my findings partially echo those of Falkner et al, whose study of EU social 
policy implementation also made note of the importance of parties in explaining outcomes 
(2005).  
  The findings of this study also suggest that soft law norms are more than just an 
additional way in which Europe can have power in domestic settings.  As the Austrian case 
illustrates, hard and soft law do not come in mutually exclusive packages.  In the SSU case, and I 
would guess in many policy fields, the attempt by European institutions to impose binding 
mandates on European states only comes after soft law norms have laid the ground work.  
Imposing binding rules on states or governing parties that have not internalized the core 
principles of the new law is courting trouble.  As the Austrian reaction to the ECHR Karner 
decision shows hard law will not always make much difference where soft law has failed.  So far 
Europe has had far greater luck influencing domestic SSU policies when its influence has been 
soft rather than hard in nature.  The importance of using soft law as a precursor to legal mandates 
may become even more important in an expanded Europe.  The level of Europe’s legitimacy 
varies greatly across the new member states but many of these societies have more in common 
with Austria than with Germany in terms of their relationship with the European polity.  In 
Austria the legal mandate to recognize same-sex cohabitants was met with mild resistance and 
inertia.  In certain Eastern European countries such as Poland and Latvia the hardening of the 
European SSU norm has led to retrenchment.  Both governments have been curtailing the rights 
  26of LGBT people over the past two years and the Latvian government has adopted a constitutional 
amendment defining marriage as institution between one man and one woman.  These 
developments suggest that Europe needs to proceed carefully in this area.  ‘Soft’ talk may be 
cheap, but it may also be very necessary.   
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